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I. INTRODUCTION
John Stuart Mill wrote, “the only purpose for which power can
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”1 This principle is most
commonly regarded in relation to the criminal law, where Justice
Anthony Kennedy acknowledged that “incarceration . . . is the most
common and one of the most feared instruments of state oppression
and state indifference . . . .”2 Going further, he wrote that “freedom
from this restraint is essential to the basic definition of liberty in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.”3

*
1.
2.
3.

Judicial Clerk to Hon. Kathy Wallace, Minnesota Third Judicial District
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (1859).
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 90 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
137
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Mill’s statement is equally applicable in cases of civil
commitment. “[P]atients face lengthy—even indeterminate—
[commitments.]”4 At the same time because the commitments are
civil and not criminal, patients have no constitutional right to a
speedy trial. 5 These patients are not without rights; indeed, the
courts have found that not providing procedural safeguards would
violate the constitutional rights. of a patient.6 Yet, looming in the
shadows is the disturbing fact that “it is the near-universal reality
that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil
commitment hearings is likely to be ineffective.”7
The United States Supreme Court has found that “incapacitation
may be a legitimate end of the civil law.”8 This is the case even if
no treatment is available to speed their recovery and release. 9
Additionally, patients who are involuntarily hospitalized are
subjected to psychiatric treatment, which may include the forced
taking of medications.10 The result is that civil commitments invade
not only the privacy of the patient, but also their person.
The reality of how these civil commitment decisions are made
under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA).11
The MCTA ought to be closely scrutinized. Michael Perlin wrote
that “the overwhelming number of cases involving mental disability
law issues are ‘litigated’ in pitch darkness. Involuntary civil
commitment cases are routinely disposed of in minutes behind
closed courtroom doors.” 12 In 1979, the United States Supreme
4. Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking A Dangerous Definition,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 63 (1999).
5. Id.
6. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414
U.S. 473 (1974) (a statute that fails to provide an allegedly mentally ill person
with adequate procedural rights is unconstitutional); see also Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding that a statute which condemned a defendant to
permanent institutionalization deprived him of his equal protection and due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need A Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral,
My Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil
Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 241, 241 (2008).
8. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365–66 (1997).
9. Id.
10. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324–25 (1993); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d
139 (Minn. 1988).
11. MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.01–24 (2018).
12. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2000).
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Court noted that the average time for an involuntary civil
commitment hearing was 9.2 minutes.13 While that has certainly not
been this author’s experience, the important thing is to realize that
a short hearing, whether 9.2 minutes or four hours, has major
implications in the life of a human being.
The American Psychiatric Association once acknowledged
“that ‘dangerousness’ is neither a psychiatric nor a medical
diagnosis, but involves issues of legal judgment and definition, as
well as issues of social policy.”14 Because of the monumental effect
on the life and liberty of a person that a civil commitment has, the
process for determining whether a civil commitment should occur
ought to be narrowly defined and readily discernable for all parties
to follow. Unfortunately, that is not the case.
The MCTA is, like any piece of legislation, a flawed statute. It
lacks sorely needed definitions of “serious physical harm” as well
as “dangerous” that would allow district courts the necessary
guidance to make decisions in a consistent manner. As a result, the
case law is inconsistent, leaving statutory ambiguities unresolved.
Section II of this article addresses in detail both the MCTA
standards for commitment as mentally ill and mentally ill and
dangerous. Each type of commitment is discussed with regard to the
requirements to make such a finding, and the process that follows
after such a finding is made. Section III addresses two points of
ambiguity within the MCTA itself: how to determine what
constitutes “serious physical harm” and how to determine whether
a person is “dangerous.” Finally, Section IV offers some
suggestions on how the MCTA could be more coherent, and
whether the responsibility to make these changes lies with the courts
or the legislature.
II. DEFINITIONS
Before delving too deeply into the MCTA distinctions between
a person who is mentally ill and a person who is mentally ill and
dangerous, a definition of mental illness is needed. The MCTA
defines mental illness as:

13.
14.

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, TASK FORCE REPORT 7: CLINICAL ASPECTS OF
THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 33 (1974).
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[A]n organic disorder of the brain or a clinically significant disorder
of thought, mood, perception, orientation, memory, or behavior that
is detailed in a diagnostic codes list published by the commissioner,
and that seriously limits a person's capacity to function in primary
aspects of daily living such as personal relations, living
arrangements, work, and recreation.15

In commitment evaluations, this definition informs the findings
of both mentally ill and mentally ill and dangerous.
A. Defining Mentally Ill
The MCTA provides a definition of what constitutes a person
who is mentally ill. A person who is mentally ill is any person who:
[H]as an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which
grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or
to reason or understand, which is manifested by instances of grossly
disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions and poses a substantial
likelihood of physical harm to self or others.16

The substantial likelihood of physical harm to others can be
manifested by the following:
(1) failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical
care as a result of the impairment;17
(2) inability for reasons other than indigence to obtain necessary
food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a result of the impairment
and it is more probable than not that the person will suffer
substantial harm, significant psychiatric deterioration or
debilitation, or serious illness, unless appropriate treatment and
services are provided;18
(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others;19 or

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

MINN. STAT. § 245.462, subdiv. 20(a) (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 13(a) (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 13(a)(1) (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 13(a)(2) (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 13(a)(3) (2018).
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(4) recent and volitional conduct involving significant damage to
substantial property.20

A person is not considered mentally ill under the MCTA if their
impairment is solely due to epilepsy; developmental disability; brief
periods of intoxication caused by alcohol, drugs, or other mindaltering substances; or dependence upon or addiction to any alcohol,
drugs or other mind-altering substances.21
For a court to order that a person be civilly committed under this
statute, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
the patient to be committed is mentally ill, developmentally
disabled, or chemically dependent. 22 The court is to consider
“reasonable alternative dispositions” including but not limited to,
dismissal of the petition, voluntary outpatient care, voluntary
admission to a treatment facility, appointment of a guardian or
conservator, or release before commitment.23 If the court finds that
no suitable alternative to judicial commitment exists, the court shall
commit the patient to the least restrictive treatment or an alternative
treatment program which meets the patient’s treatment needs. 24
Should the court order a commitment, then the initial commitment
period begins on the date that the court issues an order or a warrant
committing the patient to the care of the treatment facility. 25 The
initial commitment itself is not to exceed six months.26
The MCTA requires that the head of the treatment facility to
which a patient is committed file a treatment report with the court.27
If the patient is discharged from commitment within the first sixty
days after the initial commitment order, the head of the facility must
file a report with the court detailing the patient’s need for continuing
treatment. A copy of the report must be supplied to the county
attorney, the patient, and the patient’s counsel. 28 When a patient
remains in treatment longer than sixty days from the date of the
initial commitment order, the head of the treatment facility that has
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 13(a)(4) (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 13(a)(4)(b)(1)-(4) (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.09, subdiv. 1(a) (2018).
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. §253B.09, subdiv. 5 (2018).
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 253B.12 (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.12, subdiv. 1(a) (2018).
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custody of the patient must file a written report with the court at
least sixty days but no later than ninety days after the date of the
order.29 A copy of this report must also be supplied to the county
attorney, the patient, and the patient’s counsel.30
B. Defining Mentally Ill and Dangerous
The MCTA also defines “a person who is mentally ill and
dangerous to the public.” 31 A person who is mentally ill and
dangerous to the public is a person who is: (1) mentally ill;32 and (2)
who, due to their mental illness, presents a clear danger to the safety
of others.33 Whether a person presents a clear danger to the safety
of others is demonstrated by (1) either an overt act causing or
attempting to cause harm to another 34 and (2) a substantial
likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of inflicting
serious physical harm on another.35 A person committed as a sexual
psychopathic personality or a sexually dangerous person may also
be subject to commitment as mentally ill and dangerous to the
public.36 In order to commit a person as mentally ill and dangerous,
the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the above
criteria have been met. 37 These statutory requirements must be
strictly interpreted.38 A finding of mentally ill and dangerous does
not require that a person be convicted of a crime.39 Neither does an
acquittal foreclose the possibility of commitment as mentally ill and
dangerous.40
Minnesota case law provides a troublingly large range of
scenarios which can satisfy the “overt act” requirement. For
example, it is not necessary for murder or mayhem to occur in order
29. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12, subdiv. 1(b) (2018).
30. MINN. STAT. § 253B.12, subdiv. 1(b) (2018).
31. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 17 (2018).
32. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 17(a)(1) (2018).
33. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 17(a)(2) (2018).
34. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 17(a)(2)(i) (2018).
35. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 17(a)(2)(ii) (2018).
36. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 17(b) (2018).
37. In re Civil Commitment of Carroll, 706 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005).
38. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995) (citing In re Jasmer, 447
N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. 1989)).
39. In re Jasmer, 447 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. 1989).
40. Id.
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to meet the standard. 41 A series of attacks has been found
sufficient,42 as has a single, severe beating of a child.43 Nor does the
act need to be related to the events which led to the commitment
action.44 In re Welfare of Hofmaster involved the commitment as
mentally ill and dangerous of a man arrested for entering the Dallas
Saloon in Faribault, Minnesota.45 During this incident Hofmaster
threatened to kill the people there, as well as the responding police
officers and their families, and then threatened to “blow up the
earth.”46 Despite these actions, Hofmaster was found to be mentally
ill and dangerous based only on a stabbing which had occurred
eleven years earlier.47
Additionally, we know that “the remoteness of an overt act does
not necessarily preclude a commitment as mentally ill and
dangerous.” 48 Events preceding the commitment by more than a
decade have been found sufficient to satisfy the overt act
requirement, which raises questions as to whether a remote, prior
overt act can be shown to be a product of mental illness.49 For the
Hofmaster court, such evidence was deemed unnecessary.50
Sometimes the case law is contradictory. A particular area of
concern involves the intent of the patient. In In re Kottke, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a finding of mentally ill and
dangerous in part because Kottke’s behavior did not cause and was
not intended to cause serious physical harm. 51 At the same time,
courts have found that intent is not relevant in determining whether
conduct constitutes an overt act.52 Even more confusing, sometimes
these cases cite one another. 53 There are other issues as well
concerning the distinction between mentally ill and mentally ill and
41. Carroll, 706 N.W.2d, at 531.
42. Id. at 528–29.
43. In re Clemons, 494 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
44. See In re Welfare of Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming a district court ruling which found that a stabbing 11 years prior to the
actions precipitating the commitment hearing was not too remote.).
45. Id. at 280.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
49. Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d at 279.
50. Id. at 280.
51. In re Kottke, 433 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn. 1988).
52. In re Civil Commitment of Carroll, 706 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005).
53. Id.

144

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

dangerous. Among these issues are differentiating between
“substantial harm” and “serious physical harm,” and defining
“dangerous.”
C. Two Ambiguities
1. Physical Harm v. Serious Physical Harm
Despite a lengthy definitions section with twenty-three
subdivisions, some of which have multiple subsections, the MCTA
fails to define what constitutes “serious physical harm.” The
difference may seem obvious with “serious physical harm” being a
more extreme type of physical harm. However, because “physical
harm” is such a general concept, it is arguable that “physical harm”
includes within its definition “serious physical harm.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that the word “serious”
in mentally ill and dangerous cases is limited to the common
understanding of the word “serious.”54 Perhaps the most relevant
definition of “serious” is “having important or dangerous possible
consequences.”55 Therefore, “serious physical harm” can be defined
as “physical harm having important or dangerous consequences.”56
Any physical harm can have important or dangerous possible
consequences. By requiring the interpretation of the word “serious”
to be based upon a common understanding of its meaning, a
determination of “serious” necessarily becomes a subjective
determination, likely to change from court to court or even day to
day.
These distinctions may seem merely a quibble over semantics,
or even the type of pettifoggery that gives lawyers a bad name, but
that would be a cynical and unfair assessment. Civil commitments
often occur without related criminal convictions. It is one scenario
to order that a person convicted of a crime be confined because that
person has usually (though admittedly not always) been the
beneficiary of all of the due process rights afforded to criminal
defendants. It is something else entirely for the State to step in and
54. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995).
55. Serious, MERRIAM WEBSTER https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
nary/serious.
56. It bears noting that the courts have found that it is not necessary to refer to
criminal statutes to define “serious.” In re Lufsky, 388 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
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deprive a person of their liberty through an arguably subjective
standard, often clumsily wielded by individuals who are not mental
health professionals. The seriousness of such an action deserves
more than the interpretation of a word by a judge on any given day.
Such a power should be strictly limited, and its terms narrowly
defined.
2. Defining and Diagnosing “Dangerous”
Also missing from the MCTA is a definition of dangerousness.
Merriam-Webster defines “dangerous” as “able or likely to inflict
injury or harm.”57 So mentally ill and dangerous could be construed
as “mentally ill and able or likely to inflict injury or harm.” That is
a low bar to set when determining whether to deprive a person of
his or her liberty.
Compounding this issue is the fact that mental health
professionals are themselves unable to predict future dangerousness
precisely and with absolute certainty.58 Dr. Robert Phillips outlines
three methods relied upon by clinicians to determine whether or not
a person will be dangerous in the future: (1) the actuarial approach;
(2) the clinical approach; and (3) the structural clinical judgment
approach. 59 Dr. Phillips further warns that these different
methodological approaches are polarizing within the clinical
community.60
The actuarial approach attempts to predict an individual’s
dangerousness by using information sourced from group data
instead of individualized assessment.61 Supporters of this approach
argue that it is effective because it is devoid of any clinician bias.62
On the other hand, its accuracy in predicting dangerousness is low
because its prediction is limited to individuals who are similar to
those from whom the prediction data were drawn.63

57. Dangerous, MERRIAM WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dangerousness.
58. Robert T. M. Phillips, Predicting the Risk of Future Dangerousness, 14
AMER. MED. ASSOC. J. OF ETHICS 472, 474 (2012).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Phillips, supra note 58, at 474.
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“Clinical approaches reportedly achieve better-than-chance
levels of accuracy.”64 Detractors, however, dismiss this approach as
“anecdotal.” Advocates state that clinical approaches are based
upon the clinician’s intuition, experience, and clinical orientation.65
They worry that these factors, allegedly, lead to clinicians being
vulnerable to individual bias.66
Structured professional judgment approaches attempt to
estimate a risk of dangerousness by “reviewing and scoring a set list
of empirically validated risk factors known to be associated with
violence.”67 “Structure is imposed on which risk factors should be
considered and how they should be measured.”68 The mental health
professional’s weighing of the importance of these factors is said to
be a result of clinical judgment. 69 Such judgment is, however,
subject to the same criticisms as the pure clinical approach.
It should be troubling that mental health professions cannot
decide amongst themselves on the best methods to use for
diagnosing dangerousness, especially when viewed in light of the
fact that different experts utilizing different methods may offer
different assessments on substantially similar cases. Equally
troubling is the empirical data about success rates of predicting
dangerous acts resulting from mental illness. 70 In a recent article
assessing mental illness and mass shootings, doctors Jonathan Metzl
and Kenneth MacLeish wrote:
Data supporting the predictive value of psychiatric diagnosis in
matters of gun violence is thin at best. Psychiatric diagnosis is largely
an observational tool, not an extrapolative one. Largely for this
reason, research dating back to the 1970s suggests that psychiatrists
using clinical judgment are not much better than laypersons at

64. Id. at 475.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Phillips, supra note 58, at 475.
69. Id.
70. Robert T. M. Phillips, Predicting the Risk of Future Dangerousness, 14
AMER. MED. ASSOC. J. OF ETHICS 472, 474 (2012).
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predicting which individual patients will commit violent crimes and
which will not.71

Writing in 1978, Steadman and Cocozza found that there is
“very little literature that provides empirical evidence dealing with
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness.”72 They further found that
“despite statutory and procedural trends to the contrary, the data
available suggest no reason for involving psychiatrists in the
dispositional processes of violent offenders under the expectation
of predictive expertise.”73
The inability of mental health professionals to precisely predict
future dangerousness is further compounded by the independence
of the district courts in determining whether a patient is dangerous.
In the Matter of re DeWayne Colbert, 74 the Minnesota Supreme
Court addressed a situation where the district court issued a ruling
of mentally ill, but not mentally ill and dangerous, despite the
examiners concluding that Colbert was dangerous. Colbert arose
from a hearing to continue the commitment of Colbert as mentally
ill and dangerous.75
At the hearing, one expert, a licensed psychologist at Minnesota
Security Hospital, testified that while Colbert was not dangerous
when using drugs prescribed to him, there was a significant
likelihood that he would discontinue using them if released and that
there would then be a substantial likelihood of him posing a danger
to the safety of others.76 A psychiatrist appointed as an examiner by
the court also generally agreed with the first expert.77 This expert,
however, stated her opinion differently. She testified that Colbert’s
psychosis had been alleviated almost entirely by the medications
and that he did not present any substantial likelihood of engaging in
acts capable of inflicting serious bodily harm on someone. 78 She
71 .
Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass
Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AMER. J. OF PUB. HEALTH
240, 242–43 (2015).
72. Henry Steadman & Joseph Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the
Repetitively Violent Offender, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 226 (1978).
73. Id. at 230.
74. In re DeWayne Colbert, 454 N.W.2d 614, 614 (Minn. 1990).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 615.
77. Id.
78. Id.

148

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

also opined that Colbert might be non-compliant with taking his
medications if not at a facility; additionally she testified that she did
not trust him to continue taking his medications on his own. 79
Colbert himself testified that he realized the importance of taking
his medication and that he would continue to take his medications
once he was released.80
Despite the misgivings of these experts, the district court found
that Colbert was mentally ill, but not mentally ill and dangerous.81
The court of appeals reversed, finding that the district court’s
decision was clearly erroneous.82 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in
turn, reversed the court of appeals.83 The outcome of this saga of
reversals is that the Minnesota Supreme Court validated the ability
of the district court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
experts. Why then, have experts in the first place?
D. Solutions
1. Serious Physical Harm
What constitutes “serious physical harm?” As noted above, the
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that “serious” should be
limited to the common understanding of the word “serious.”84 This
provides little guidance and opens the door to a broad range of
interpretations by the mental health professionals examining the
patient and by the judge presiding over the commitment hearing.
The district court should ideally limit its decision to the plain
language of the statute. In the event that the statutory language is
ambiguous, legislative history may provide guidance, though it
should not be considered binding. Here, however, there is little in
the legislative history that is of use in determining how “serious
physical harm” should be interpreted.
One possible definition of “serious physical harm” could be
“physical harm that is life-threatening, fatal, or likely to result in
temporary or permanent disability.” One benefit of this narrow
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Colbert, 454 N.W.2d at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 616.
In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995).
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definition is that it limits the range of violent acts that can be
considered serious. On a given day, a district court judge might
consider an assault in which a person is struck in the back, resulting
in a fall and a sprained thumb, to be sufficient to believe that a
patient who committed the attack might commit further acts
resulting in serious physical harm. 85 It is hardly defensible to
compare such a minor attack to a situation wherein a person
suffering from a mental illness stabbed the wife of the man she
believed loved her.86
While it is possible that the Minnesota Supreme Court could
take it upon itself to offer a definition of “serious physical harm,”
the responsibility to create such a definition truly rests with the State
Legislature. Defining “serious physical harm” would allow the
Legislature to guide the courts towards effectively interpreting the
statute as intended.
2. A Definition of Dangerous
In a 1974 article, the editors of the Harvard Law Review noted
that because the level of dangerousness must be great enough to
outweigh the severe deprivations in individual liberty, very few
people should be committable under the police power.87 Without a
definition of “dangerousness,” district courts have held that a single
incident involving a severe beating is enough for someone to be
considered dangerous, 88 while a person with a history of assaults
and threatening behavior (including threatening someone with an
open knife) is not dangerous.89 Regardless of how a judge might
value legislative history, it provides little help in interpreting the
law. So, with just the plain language of the text to guide the district
courts, more guidance is needed from the legislature.
I would argue that the MCTA should be amended to include a
definition of “dangerous.” A possible definition could be “a person
is considered ‘dangerous’ if they have a prior history of violent acts
85. See In re Kottke, 433 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Minn. 1988) (The Minnesota
Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with the district court and reversed).
86. In re Mikulanec, 356 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Minn. 1984).
87. See Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1241
(1974) (footnotes omitted).
88. See, e.g., Clemons, 494 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
89. See, e.g., Colbert, 454 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990).
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related to, or there is a high probability that they will commit a
violent act as a result of, their mental illness.” A prior history of
violent acts related to a patient’s mental health creates a strong
presumption that a person is dangerous. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated that when considering whether a person is mentally
ill and dangerous, the court should consider the person’s entire
history. 90 Conversely, a history of violent acts unrelated to the
patient’s mental health is simply indicative of a propensity towards
violence. In the latter case, those violent acts should not be used as
a vehicle to deprive a person, not charged with a crime, of their
liberty and their privacy.91 There should be a demonstrable nexus
between the mental illness and the prior or potential violent acts.
The second part of this definition, that there is a high probability
that the patient will commit a violent act as a result of their mental
illness, is slightly more challenging. As argued above, empirical
evidence shows that even mental health professionals are unable to
predict violence with a high degree of accuracy. 92 Unfortunately,
there is little choice other than to depend on the opinions of
professionals and the discretion of judges. For that purpose, a
narrow definition of “dangerous” offers some degree of guidance
that does not currently exist.
3. Mental Health Courts
A final suggestion is to extend the jurisdiction of mental health
courts to include civil commitment hearings. Mental health courts
are part of a movement towards therapeutic jurisprudence designed
to address specific offender populations who do not respond well to
traditional correctional methods.93 Therapeutic jurisprudence aims
at a problem-solving approach.94 To that end, the earliest example
of a problem-solving court was the Miami-Dade drug court in

90. See Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d at 281.
91. This is arguably getting into the realm of multiple punishments for one act.
92. See Phillips, supra note 58, at 474.
93. John H. Guthmann, Ramsey County Mental Health Court: Working with
Community Partners to Improve the Lives of Mentally Ill Defendants, Reduce
Recidivism, and Enhance Public Safety, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 948, 950
(2015).
94. Id.
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Florida, founded in 1989. 95 Drug courts first made their way to
Minnesota in 1996, becoming widespread in the mid-2000s.96
The success of drug courts has led to the establishment of other
problem-solving courts, including DWI courts, juvenile courts, and
mental health courts. 97 The unique issues facing the mentally ill
were first addressed from a therapeutic jurisprudence when
Broward County, Florida opened what is considered to be the first
modern mental health court in 1997.98 There are now several mental
health courts in Minnesota as well.99
The argument for giving mental health courts jurisdiction over
civil commitments rests on the knowledge and experience gained
by the personnel regularly involved in those programs. Michael
Perlin has argued that counsel representing patients in civil
commitment hearings can be “woefully inadequate—disinterested,
uninformed, roleless, and often hostile.”100 Conversely, Perlin has
argued that the petitioner in civil commitment issues (usually the
state) also has a lackluster track record. 101 Such was the concern
when late Chief Justice Warren Burger once wrote that at retrial, “I
would hope these sensitive and important issues would have the
benefit of more effective presentation and articulation on behalf of
petitioner.”102
The team-based approach often found in problem-solving
courts, including mental health courts, offers the presiding judge
insight from members of the criminal justice system as well as
treatment agencies. 103 Given the wide range of expertise and
specialized knowledge available to such a team, and considering the
95. Id. at 951.
96. Id. at 954.
97. Id. at 955.
98. Id. at 960.
99. Id.
100. Michael L. Perlin, And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even Say What
it is I’ve Got: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment
Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 738 (2005).
101 .
Michael L. Perlin, “Who Will Judge the Many When the Game is
Through?”: Considering the Profound Differences Between Mental Health
Courts and “Traditional” Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 937, 942 (2018).
102. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 n.1 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
103. Perlin, supra note 101, at 947.
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body of research showing that it is difficult even for professionals
to predict dangerousness in mental health patients, it is reasonable
to think that a mental health court would be better situated to
determine whether a patient is mentally ill and dangerous than a
typical district court. At worst, the court could not be found to have
failed due to lack of expertise, interest from involved parties, or
negligence of counsel.
There are, of course, counter-arguments to be made against
transferring jurisdiction to mental health courts. First, there are a
limited number of mental health courts available in Minnesota.104
Few counties have a mental health court, and even some larger
counties, such as Olmsted County, lack such a court. One possible
answer to this argument is that not every county needs a mental
health court. A metropolitan county may have need for its own
mental health court, but for rural counties it may be more efficient
for the judicial district itself to establish one mental health court.
Ultimately, if the State is willing to ask that a person have their
liberty wrested from them without an attendant criminal conviction,
the State ought to be willing to provide a forum capable of reaching
the most informed decision possible, and then be willing to travel to
that forum as well.
A second, related argument against transferring jurisdiction to
mental health courts is that it would be expensive to set up new
mental health courts in the first place. Costs are, of course, always
a concern, especially when it comes to spending taxpayer money.
Even so, mental health courts provide a unique opportunity to create
meaningful partnerships which involve the entire mental health
community. As an example, grants are often a means by which
problem-solving courts find funding to cover startup costs and
operations. Partnering with an organization, such as a medical
school psychiatry program, would allow the new court to include
the clinical expertise of the professors, provide access to further
grant money meant for research, and generate research data as
which may in turn improve the ability of professionals to further
assess whether an individual who is mentally ill is also dangerous.
In a data driven age, such a partnership would be ideal; yet it is only
one possible method of using a partnership to help establish and
fund a mental health court.

104.

See Guthmann, supra note 93, at 960.
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4. The Role of the Legislature
It bears mentioning that none of these changes should be made
by the courts. While courts certainly have a degree of latitude in
determining ambiguous statutory language, correcting that language
and creating, funding, and implementing new policy is inherently
the nature of the legislature. The role of the district courts in civil
commitments should not be that of fact-finder, legal arbiter, and
amateur forensic psychiatrist. Nor should the Minnesota Supreme
Court or the court of appeals be responsible for determining, from
vague statutes, how to assess complicated medical issues. This
guidance must come from the legislature and the legislature alone.
III. CONCLUSION
When considering whether to commit a person as mentally ill or
mentally ill and dangerous, the district court carries a heavy burden.
Not only does the court, staffed by psychiatric amateurs, determine
whether a patient’s freedom should be involuntarily surrendered
without an attendant criminal conviction, but the court must do so
with only the personal judgment of the presiding judge and with the
aid of mental health professionals who are themselves ill-equipped
to adequately determine if an individual is dangerous. This is further
exacerbated by the ambiguous text of the MCTA.
There are no easy solutions to this problem, but a starting point
would be to narrow the scope of the statute by providing definitions
of “serious physical harm” and “dangerous”. Doing so would give
courts the guidance necessary to determine whom to send to the
state hospital and whom to commit to local mental health care.
Additionally, transferring jurisdiction for civil commitments to
mental health courts would serve the purpose of consolidating
mental health expertise and experience into a team setting,
providing the best likelihood that a district court judge will make
the best decision. These small steps may not solve the issues of the
MCTA, but it is better to attempt to change what we know does not
work, than to be complacent with the rights of the vulnerable.

